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Interregional differences in taxes and population mobility 
 





Belgium is a federal state where regional fiscal competences have been increasing. In 
particular, the regions are now able to increase or to lower the personal income tax 
burden of their residents via positive and negative surcharges. Should the regions adopt 
the possibilities opened by the Law, would it influence interregional mobility? 
 
It is not possible to assert directly this question. However, indirect evidence of the 
impact of fiscal disparities on mobility can be found by analysing the mobility between 
municipalities. Indeed, for long, the real estate income tax and the local surcharges on 
the federal personal income tax have not been uniform on the Belgian territory. We tried 
to quantify whether those tax differences generated population moves from the more 
expensive municipalities to the less expensive ones.  
 
The attractiveness of the municipalities measured by means of their intra Belgium 
migration balance has been explained by local wealth, employment rate, quality of the 
local administration, proximity to the coast, three indexes constructed by a factor 
analysis based on a satisfaction survey, housing prices and local taxation.  
 
Our estimations showed that local tax level has no significant impact on the local 
migration balance. Is this observation transposable at the regional level? On one side, 
the answer to this question depends on the level of disparities in tax rates that such a 
practice would introduce. On the other side, if disparities in regional tax were to appear, 
interregional mobility would be slowed down by the impact of the interregional cultural 
differences.  
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1  Introduction 
 
As other federal states, Belgium has experienced a decentralisation of competences 
towards regional areas for several decades. As a result, interregional differences in tax 
rates have appeared. In particular, the regions are now able to increase or to lower the 
personal income tax burden of their residents via positive and negative surcharges.
2 In 
this context, a question is worth to be asked: would interregional differences in personal 
income tax rate have an impact on the mobility of the population?
3 
 
Even though the Flemish region did use the possibilities opened by the legislation in 
1999, it did so only as a temporary measure. As a consequence, it is not possible to 
answer this question directly. However, indirect evidence of the impact of fiscal 
disparities on mobility in Belgium can be found by analysing the willingness to move 
between municipalities. Indeed, for a long time, two specific taxes have not been 
uniform on the Belgian territory. The real estate income tax, which differs among 
municipalities
4 and additionally, the federal personal income tax surcharges that 
municipalities freely set locally. 
 
In this paper, our aim is to determine whether those differences in tax burden did have 
any impact on the intra Belgium moving. There is no survey of the population that 
records the motivations of moving. But, getting indirect evidence of the impact of 
taxation on mobility is possible by analysing the evolution of municipal population. Did 
populations in municipalities with low taxes grow more than in municipalities with high 
tax burdens? Of course, the tax level is only one of the potential determinants of 
location, as people tend to locate in places that suit them best. To isolate the impact of 
taxes on residential mobility, we have to control for other local costs such as the price of 
housing and for the factors that make a municipality more or less attractive. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief overview of intermunicipal 
mobility in Belgium and introduces our dependent variable. In section III, we set out the 
                                                 
2 ‘Loi spéciale de financement du 16 janvier 1989’ modified by the ‘Loi spéciale de financement du 13 
juillet 2001’.  
3 Indeed, as a part of the literature about the fiscal federalism has shown, people tend to choose their 
preferred combination of public goods and taxes. This can lead to fiscal competition and population 
moves (Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), Pines and Thisse (1995) in Brueckner (2004)).   4
factors that can potentially influence the relative attractiveness of municipalities and 
introduce the selected explanatory variables. Section IV describes the method followed 
in order to assess the impact of local tax differences and other relevant variables on the 
residential mobility. Finally, section V presents the most significant results before 
concluding. The analysis is based on the period 1990-1998, which has registered stable 
local tax disparities. 
 
2  Residential mobility in Belgium: the figures 
 
Intermunicipal mobility in Belgium is important as yearly 4.20 % of the population 
moved from one municipality to another during the period 1990-1998. 
 
Table 1: Average annual number of migrant people between Belgian 
municipalities (1990-1998), as a % of the total population 
In the whole country  4.20%
Within the same region  3.60%
Between the regions  0.60%
Source: National Institute for Statistics 
 
We choose to measure the attractiveness of the municipalities by means of their intra 
Belgian migration balance. The migration balance has been considered relative to the 
population size of the municipality as population size can strongly differ from one 
municipality to another one in Belgium. 
 
Those balances differed significantly within the municipalities. The important negative 
balances of most municipalities in the Brussels region can already be noticed. 
 
Table 2: Balance of the Belgian municipal migrations on the period 1990-1998, % 
of the population of the municipality, average on the country and the regions 
   Average  Minimum  Maximum 
Belgium  2.64%  -22.91% 21.88% 
Flemish Region  2.30%  -12.26% 13.85% 
Walloon Region  3.76%  -8.72% 21.88% 
Brussels Region  -7.32%  -22.91% 3.33% 
                                                                                                                                               
4 Its rate is determined at three different levels: regional, provincial and municipal.   5
Source: National Institute for Statistics 
 
3  Why are some locations more attractive? 
 
Our analysis is based on the evolution of the municipal migrants balance. This means 
that only municipal characteristics that make the municipality attractive can be 
considered.  Personal relocation incentives such as the proximity to family and friends, 
lifecycle position (wedding, birth of children) or education level cannot be taken into 
account. 
 
Residential location is the result of a trade-off between the cost of relocation and the 
advantages that it can bring. In this section, we try to identify from the literature the 
elements that increase or decrease the attractiveness of a specific location. 
 
3.1  Some advantages 
 
First, differences in regional economic activities can lead to different employment rates 
and levels of income per capita. Generally, migrants are attracted by areas with high 
income and flee those with low income.
5 So, the stronger the disparities of income 
among municipalities, the bigger the population movements. In Canada, for example, 
regional wealth differences are considered as one of the most important incentives to 
mobility.
6 In Belgium, even if economic policy is mainly determined at the regional 
level, intraregional variations in wealth and economic activity exist. Secondly, job 
opportunities could encourage intermunicipal mobility. However the exiguity of the 
Belgian territory and the very intense network of roads and railways may limit this 
impact, as in fact commuting is a phenomenon worth mentioning in Belgium (Caruso, 
2003, p.15). 
 
The economic environment is not the only determinant of the local quality of life. The 
urban location has two obvious advantages: reduced commuting costs and an increased 
accessibility to public and private facilities (swimming pools, restaurants, theatres…), 
                                                 
5 Although, the attraction of rich regions is stronger than the ‘push’ effect of the poor regions. Indeed, 
poor people have less financial resources to move.     
6 See Courchene  (1970) and Vanderkamp  (1973).    6
(BFP, 2002). Brueckner et al. (1999) distinguish three categories of urban amenities: 
natural amenities, historical amenities and modern amenities. The first two refer 
respectively to topographical features (rivers, coastline…) and infrastructure from past 
eras (monuments…). These are exogenous. Modern amenities depend in particular on 
local income levels. A city with high natural and historical amenities (such as Paris) will 
be more attractive.  However, the natural and historical urban amenities’ attractiveness 
declines strongly with the distance from the centre.  
 
But the recent phenomenon of urban spreading has led to pollution problems, road 
congestion, lack of parking places, etc… Housing prices have also increased. These 
aspects reduce the attractiveness of the city. Theoretically, it is difficult to determine if 
the urban areas are currently more attractive than other areas. Some studies
7 show that, 
as far as rich people are concerned, two opposite forces play a role: rich people have a 
high housing consumption that is easier to satisfy in the suburbs, but they also want to 
reduce their commuting time. 
 
In Belgium, some studies
8 have shown that young people (18-24 years) in search of job 
or formation tend to live into urban areas. They offer them more job opportunities and 
gather universities and high schools. After wedding or the birth of children, families 
tend to move from urban areas to the countryside in search of a roomier housing and a 
better life environment. On the opposite some older people want to go back to the city. 
The net impact on the urban balance is thus a priori unclear. 
 
The potential explanatory variables were included accordingly to their availability.
9 
 
Local wealth has been measured by per capita personal income in the municipality. 
 
The attractiveness of the municipality has been measured by the employment rate, 
measured by the share of the working population in the total active population, an index 
of the quality of the local administration, the proximity to the coast and three factors 
                                                 
7 Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), Muth (1969) in Brueckner et al. (1999). 
8 Savenberg and Van Hecke (1998), Eggerickx et al. (2002), BFP (2004). 
9 Appendix 1 mentions the data sources and gives a summary statistic for each of them.   7
constructed by factor analysis with varimax rotation. These factors are based on a socio-
economic survey carried out in 2001 by the National Institute for Statistics (INS). 
 
The INS questions intended to measure the satisfaction of households about the quality 
of their neighbourhood: calm, air quality, cleanliness, store proximity, quality of roads, 
transport infrastructure, health services… The INS survey led to satisfaction indexes, 
for each aspect and for each municipality. These indexes constituted, according to us, 
important information about the valuation of the amenities and quality of the living 
environment. To ease their interpretation we carried out a factor analysis in order to 
identify some common dimensions to these many indexes. Three factors were retained. 
 
Table 3: Factors retained by the factor analysis  
   Rotated Factor Loadings (varimax rotation) 
Quality of  Factor 1 Factor  2 Factor  3  Uniqueness 
Professions services  0.89  0.31 0.03  0.11 
Shopping facilities  0.87  0.20 -0.25  0.14 
Health services  0.80  0.29 -0.06  0.27 
Transport facilities  0.63  0.24 -0.44  0.35 
Roads 0.32  0.84  0.21 0.14 
Cycle tracks  0.30  0.81  0.16 0.24 
Pavements 0.44  0.64  -0.30 0.31 
Buildings (attractiveness)  -0.02  0.04  0.96  0.07 
Cleanness 0.00  0.21  0.94  0.08 
Air   -0.28  -0.13  0.85  0.19 
Calm -0.34  0.01  0.84  0.17 
Open space  0.04  0.13  0.78  0.36 
Source: Own calculations based on National Institute For Statistics (INS), socio economic 
survey of 2001 
 
The three relevant factors reflect three particular characteristics of location that seem 
relevant for our analysis: private facilities (factor 1), roadway quality (factor 2) and the 
charm of the environment (factor 3). Indeed, factor 1 mainly accounts for the 
availability and quality of professions, of shopping facilities, of health services and of 
transport facilities. Factor 2 is related to the quality of roads, of cycle tracks and of 
pavements… Finally, factor 3 gathers all the characteristics of a charming environment: 
attractiveness of the buildings, cleanness, pure air, calm and open space. 
   8
3.2  Prices of housing 
 
It is evident that ceteris paribus, households will prefer to locate where housing is 
cheaper. However, there is a possible trade-off between housing prices and taxes as 
taxes can be integrated in the prices of housing (Goodspeed, 1998). A higher price can 
be compensated by a lower taxation so that the impact on mobility can be unclear. The 
Goodspeed results apply in the case of the Flemish Region where the fiscal burden is 
the lowest in the country (see 3.3 below), and where the real prices are higher than the 
national average, but not in the Brussels Region that shows simultaneously high taxes 
and high housing prices. 
 
Table 4 : Real prices of houses in 1997, (Belgium = 100) 
   Average  Minimum  Maximum 
Belgium  100.0  100.0 100.0 
Flemish Region  106.5  131.0 93.8 
Walloon Region  88.7  100.0 100.0 
Brussels Region  149.7  246.0 97.9 
Source : ‘CGER : Guide des valeurs immobilières’, Crew 
 
Additionally, in Belgium, high housing prices are related to low unemployment rates 
(Caruso, 2003). 
 
3.3  The role of taxes 
 
A part of the literature about fiscal decentralisation has shown that people tend to 
choose to live where the combination of public goods and taxes is the most 
advantageous. This can lead to tax competition between places and population moves,
10 
as local authorities try to reduce taxes under the constraint of a given supply of public 
good in order to attract the tax base. Some authors
11 have shown that decentralisation of 
redistribution leads to some problems as well, as rich people flee the areas with high 
redistribution taxes, although poorer people try to locate in these ones. This induces an 
under optimal repartition of the population in space and an under financing of the 
redistribution. 
                                                 
10 Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), Pines and Thisse (1995) in Brueckner (2004).   9
 
As mentioned before, two taxes vary locally in Belgium, namely the real estate income 
tax (REIT) and the local surcharge on the Personal Income Tax (PIT). 
 
Expression (1) provides a compound rate for those taxes at the municipality level: 
(surcharge on P.I.T *total  P.I.T) + (REIT rate * local real estate income)          (1) 
total personal income 
 
Table 5 shows the dispersion of the local tax rate. 
  
Table 5: Tax burden in the Belgian municipalities (% of the total personal 
income), average on the country and the regions 
Tax burden in 1990   Average Minimum  Maximum  Standard  deviation
Belgium 2.8%  1.3%  11.8%  0.8% 
Flemish Region  2.5%  1.4%  5.0%  0.5% 
Walloon Region  3.0%  1.3%  11.8%  0.8% 
Brussels Region  4.2%  3.1%  7.5%  1.0% 
Source: Actualités fiscales, ced-Samson  
 
4  Methodology 
 
Two problems had to be addressed before estimating the impact of the exogenous 
variables on the local population balance. Two variables are likely endogenous: the 
local tax rate and the prices of housing. 
 
Indeed, the local tax rate could be related with the migration balance in two ways. First 
a positive balance implies a higher tax base and could induce the municipality to lower 
its tax rate, but on the opposite a higher population means a higher need for public local 
services what could induce municipalities to increase their rate. In practice it appears 
that during the analysed period rates moved very little (they increased in average of 0.26 
percentage points) and that changes were not related with the migration balance (See 
annex 2 for more details). This analysis enables us to conclude that there is no obvious 
endogeneity in this case. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
11 Brown and Oates (1987) in Figuieres and al (2004), Guihéry (2002, résumé de thèse).    10
Prices of housing are clearly related with the migration balance because a high positive 
balance means a pressure of demand. For this reason, we opted for a 2-stage-least-
squares method with the urbanization level
12 as instrument. 
 
5  Results 
 
Table 6: Estimation of the impact of the local tax rate and other relevant variables 
on the migration balances of the municipalities (1990-1998)* 
   Coefficient Std. Err.  t  P <  |t| 
Constant -39.70  6.43  -6.18  0.00 
Local per capita income  0.05  0.01  8.71  0.00 
Employment  0.30 0.07 4.47 0.00 
Quality of administration  0.14  0.03  5.26  0.00 
Beach  6.49 1.74 3.73 0.00 
Privates services quality (factor 1) -2.23  0.29  -7.68  0.00 
Road quality (factor 2)  -1.97  0.31  -6.44  0.00 
Charming environment (factor 3)  1.11  0.25  4.38  0.00 
Housing price  -0.006  0.00  -5.93  0.00 
Local tax rate  -0.05  0.33  -0.16  0.88 
* TSLS ; n=589; instrumented variable: Housing price; Instrument: urbanization level 
 
The results shown in this table meet, to some extent, the intuitions and observations 
recorded in the literature. First, wealth and job opportunities clearly increase the 
attractiveness of a municipality. The coefficients of the local per capita income and 
employment are actually positive and significant. Economic disparities within Belgian 
municipalities therefore led to population movements towards the wealthiest ones. 
 
Three others local characteristics significantly increase the attractiveness of the 
municipalities: the quality of the local administration (including post office, police and 
population services), the proximity of the beach and a charming environment. 
 
Surprisingly, the quality of the private services (such as professions, shopping facilities, 
health services…) and the quality of the roadway have a negative (and significant) 
impact on migration balances. Those characteristics are typical advantages of an urban 
environment. In our view, the negative observed relation is just a reflection of the 
                                                 
12 This urbanization index is the percentage of land occupied by buildings, roads and  ways, parks and   11
exodus phenomenon from the cities and particularly from Brussels. It is worth noticing 
than even after controlling for population density, those two variables kept their highly 
significant negative impact on the migration balance. 
 
Switching to the impact of the cost factors, we observe as expected a negative influence 
of housing prices. 
 
Turning to the relation between the local tax burden and municipality attractiveness, we 
find a negative, but non-significant impact. So far, we cannot claim that disparities in 
local taxes have been an incentive to relocate.
13 
 
It can be shown that there is a negative correlation between the local tax burden and per 
capita income  (See annex 3). As a consequence, if we omit to consider the wealth 
indicator within the list of explanatory variables, a significant and negative relation 
appears between the local tax level and the attractiveness of the municipality (see 
annex 3). People tend to relocate to richer municipalities and at the same time to a more 
favourable tax system. Our estimations indicate however that the former effect has a 
higher explanatory power. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
Did differences in tax burden have an impact on the intra Belgium movements? 
Currently, there is no survey of the population that records the motivations for moving. 
We therefore tried to get indirect evidence of the impact of taxation on mobility by 
analysing the evolution of municipal migration balances, taken as indicator of 
attractiveness of the municipalities. 
 
Our estimations show that local tax level has no significant impact on the local 
migration balance. Is this observation transposable at the regional level? Should the 
                                                                                                                                               
gardens. 
13 Our observations confirm the results of Heyndels (1990) about the impact of differences in local taxes 
on population movements between neighbouring municipalities.   12
regions apply rebates or surcharges on the federal personal income tax of its residents, 
would this not influence interregional mobility? 
 
On one side, the answer to this question depends on the level of disparities in tax rates 
that such a practice would introduce. Currently, we know that local tax variations have 
no impact on mobility. But local taxes, although they have a big variance, remain at a 
relatively low level when compared to the federal taxation (2.7% of the local taxable 
income against a marginal federal rate of 55%). 
 
On the other side, if disparities in regional tax were to appear, interregional mobility 
would be slowed down by the impact of the interregional cultural differences. Till now 
interregional delocalisation is very small. Only 0.6% of the population yearly crossed 
the regional border during the period 1990-1998 (see table1). Poulain and al (2000) 
showed that linguistic and cultural differences between the Flemish and Walloon 
regions restrain interregional migration to a large extent. This ‘border effect’ also 
increases with time. 
   13
7  Appendix 
 
7.1  Appendix 1: Data sources and values 
 
Table 7: Data sources and level of observation      
  Sources  
Level of 
observation 
Migration balance  National Institute for Statistics   Municipality 
Local per capita income  National Institute for Statistics :  Financial Statistics   Municipality 
Employment  National Institute for Statistics : Regional Statistics   District 
Quality of administration  National Institute for Statistics : Socio economic Survey 2001  Municipality 
Beach Crew  calculations  Municipality 
Privates services quality   Crew  Calculations based on : INS,  Socio economic Survey 2001  Municipality 
Road quality   Crew  Calculations based on : INS,  Socio economic Survey 2001  Municipality 
Charming environment   Crew  Calculations based on : INS,  Socio economic Survey 2001  Municipality 
Housing price  Fortis Bank : Guide of property values   District 
Local tax rate  Owned Calculations based on : National Institute for Statistics   Municipality 
  "Actualités fiscales" ced-Samson   
 
Table 8: Data values 
   Average  Minimum  Maximum 
Migration balance (%)  2.64  -22.92  21.88 
Local per capita income (*1000 BEF) 394.80  192.10  593.20 
Employment (%)  83.22  67.10  92.80 
Quality of administration  97.98  67.00  132.40 
Beach    0 if not at the coast  1 if at the coast 
Privates services quality (factor 1)  0.00  -5.85  2.76 
Road quality (factor 2)  0.00  -2.65  2.81 
Charming environment (factor 3)  0.00  -4.11  2.52 
Housing price (*1000 BEF)  2,903.140  1,767.00  4,438.00 
Local tax rate (%)  2.76  1.30  11.80 
N=589 
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7.2  Appendix 2: Is the local tax rate endogenous? 
 
Local tax rates changed only slightly during the period of observations, as it appears in 
the following table. They gained 0.26 percentage points in average with a slope 
coefficient not significantly different from 1. 
 
Table 9 : Estimated relation between the local taxation in 1997 and in 1990 
  Coefficient Std. Err.  t  P <  |t| 
Constant 0.26  0.04  6.02  0 
Local tax rate in 1990  0.10  0.02  65.93  0.00 
n=589, R2 = 0.88 
 
It appears that there is no significant relation between the increase in the local tax 
burden and the migration balance, as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 10: Estimated relation between an increase in the local tax burden and a 
positive migration balance 
   Coefficient Std. Err.  t  P <  |t| 
Constant  0.25  0.02 11.22 0.00 
Migration  balance  0.01 0.00 1.33 0.18 
n=447, R2 = 0.004 
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7.3  Appendix 3 : The impact of ignoring the per capita income 
 
The local tax rate and the per capita income are significantly negatively related.  
Table 11: Estimated relation between the local tax rate and the per capita income 
  Coefficient  Std. Err.  t  P <  |t| 
Constant  4.93  0.21 23.87 0.00 
Per capita income  -0.01  0.00  -10.64  0.00 
n=589, R2=0.16 
 
If per capita income is excluded from the regression, the negative local tax rate 
coefficient becomes significant (see table below). In our opinion, however, this 
coefficient is biased.  
 
Table 12 : Estimated relation between the migration balance and some variables, 
ignoring the per capita income 
   Coefficient Std. Err.  t  P <  |t| 
Constant -19.13  4.98  -3.84  0.00 
Employment  0.25 0.06 4.14 0.00 
Quality of administration  0.14  0.03  5.48  0.00 
Beach  6.28 1.59 3.94 0.00 
Privates services quality (factor 1) -1.66  0.26  -6.29  0.00 
Road quality (factor 2)  -1.73  0.28  -6.29  0.00 
Charming environment (factor 3)  1.21  0.23  5.23  0.00 
Housing price  -0.003  0.00  -4.11  0.00 
Local tax rate  -1.22  0.28  -4.37  0.00 
   16
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